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II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
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selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
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decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
1
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-

























































SOURCE // Bahrain Census and Demographic Statistics, 2010 
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
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MAP // RECLAIM (Ministry of Culture), 2010
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
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MAP // RECLAIM (Ministry of Culture), 2010
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-


















































FIGURE I // CATCH LANDINGS BY YEAR 
SOURCE // Annual Fisheries Statistics Report, Directorate of Fisheries, 2013 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-































































FIGURE III // IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY YEAR
SOURCE // Annual Fisheries Statistics Report, Directorate of Fisheries, 2013 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 








































FIGURE II // CATCH RATES PER UNIT EFFORT (CPUE) BY YEAR
SOURCE // Annual Fisheries Statistics Report, Directorate of Fisheries, 2013 
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 

































FIGURE V // BOAT LICENSES BY YEAR 
SOURCE // Annual Fisheries Statistics Report, Directorate of Fisheries, 2013 
Fishing Industry by Citizenship and Type of Occupation
Year Bahraini Foreign Part Time Bahraini Part Time Foreign Change in Bahraini Full Time (%) Ratio (B:F)
TABLE III
1983 1,822 304 1,489 10 - 5.99
1988 1,121 726 535 2 (38.5) 1.54
1993 2,321 1,826 297 80 107.0 1.27
1998 1,655 2,547 568 0 (29.7) 0.65
2004 1,714 2,993 2,145 0 4.6 0.57
SOURCE // Annual Fisheries Statistics Report, Directorate of Fisheries, 2013 
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 







Two Rounds of Loans capped 
at BD 5,000 ($13,262); low 
interest and low fee
Per-unit basis 100 Bahraini fils per liter, up 
from 70 Bahraini fils; projected  
120 Bahraini fils by 2017 
Subsidized to approximately 25 
Bahraini fils per liter 
Subsidized to aapproximately 
30 Bahraini fils per liter 
Per-unit basis; Average price of 
fish in Saudi Arabia is 2.5 times 
higher than in Bahrain 
Running salaries for fishermen
Running salary of 15,,000 
Dirham a month ($4,083); 
additional 4,800 Dirhams a 
month ($1,326) distributed to 
accommodate for coast of living
Loans capped at 1,000,000 
Riyals ($266,645) for up to 10 
years; very low interest rates; 
repayment of 75% loan value 
Loan capped at 250,000 Riyals 
($68,653); Annual interest of 1%; 
loan period up to 5 years with 
grace period of 2 months were 
no payments are necessary
No interest loans; possibility of 
debt being completely dropped 
following a Monarchical Decree
Approximately 350 Bahraini fils 
per liter
Income Structure Price of Diesel 
TABLE IV
SOURCE // Interviews; Sea Around Us Project (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014)
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. IMAGE I // Al-Madina Al-Shamaliya
Source // Fatema Alzeera
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 







IMAGE II // Bahrain Maritime Boundaries
SOURCE // Malcolm Evans, 2002
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
“Day by day, I feel less connected to 
the ocean. I don’t understand it any-
more; I don’t interact with it like I 
used to” 
                        Fisherman I 
22
IMAGE II // Bahrain Maritime Boundaries
SOURCE // Malcolm Evans, 2002
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
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but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
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ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
XV // ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Profes-
sor Clara Irazabal, and reader, Professor Jyoti 
Hosagrahar, for their guidance and consistent 
drive throughout this process. I would also like 
to acknowledge the Board at the Professional 
Society of Fishermen in Bahrain for their 
accommodation and provision of interviews, 
and their members for the significant insight 
shared about their experiences within the 
fishing industry. Many thanks and apprecia-
tion to my parents, who supported me both 
emotionally and academically in any way they 
could, and to my fellow classmates at GSAPP 
who were pivotal in helping me craft my 
framework and ideas.
Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
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selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
1
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
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selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  



















fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ- 2
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE
 
Social infrastructure and services
Crime and social order
Culture and customs
Community health and safety
Labor 
Gender and vulnerable groups
Human rights and security
SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 
In-migration, out-migration, workers’ camps, social inclusion, growth or 
decline of towns, conflict and tensions between social groups 
Demands on and investment in housing, skills (shortages and staff 
retention), childcare, health, education, and training
Corruption, domestic violence, sexual violence, substance abuse and 
trafficking, prostitution, change in social norms, pace of change for 
vulnerable communities
Change in traditional family roles, changing production and employment 
base, effect of cash economy, reduced participation in civil society, 
community cohesion, sense of place, community leadership, cultural 
heritage
Disease, vehicle accidents, spills, alcohol and substance abuse, pollution, 
interruption to traditional food supply, awareness and treatment 
programs
Health and safety, working conditions, remuneration, right to assemble
Disproportionate experience of impact and marginalization of vulnerable 
groups (e.g., women, disabled, aged, ethnic minorities, indigenous, and 
young), equity in participation and employment
Abuses by security personnel (government, contractor, company), social 
disorder in camps, suppression of demonstrations, targeting of activists, 
rights awareness programs
Land, mobility, water (groundwater, river, ocean), mineral resources 
(artisanal and small-scale mining), cultural heritage, forest resources
Consultation, communication, participation, empowerment, access to 
decision makers, transparency, timing, inclusiveness – particularly for 
vulnerable and marginalized groups – respect of customs and authority 
structures, reporting
Indigenous sovereignty/title (free, prior, and informed consent), community 
consent
Planning, development of programs, monitoring, selection of alternatives and 
technologies, operational aspects








The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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APPENDIX II // ADOPTED SOCIAL IMPACT CATEEGORIES FOR RESEARCH 
In-migration, out-migration, social inclusion, conflict and tensions between 
social groups 
Demands on and investment in housing, skills (shortages and staff 
retention), childcare, health, education, and training
Corruption, pace of change for vulnerable communities
Change in traditional family roles, changing production and employment 
base, reduced participation in civil society, community cohesion, sense of 
place
Pollution, interruption to traditional food supply
Health and safety, working conditions, right to assemble
Disproportionate experience of impact and marginalization of vulnerable 
groups (e.g., women, disabled, aged, ethnic minorities, indigenous, and 
young), equity in participation and employment
Abuses by security personnel (government, contractor, company), 
suppression of demonstrations, targeting of activists, rights awareness 
programs
Land, mobility, water (groundwater, river, ocean), cultural heritage
Consultation, communication, participation, empowerment, access to 
decision makers, transparency, timing, inclusiveness – particularly for 
vulnerable and marginalized groups – respect of customs and authority 
structures, reporting
Indigenous sovereignty/title (free, prior, and informed consent), 
community consent
Planning, development of programs, monitoring, selection of alternatives 
and technologies, operational aspects
Grievance and dispute resolution, acknowledgment of issues, 
compensation, mitigation
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE
 
Social infrastructure and services
Crime and social order
Culture and customs
Community health and safety
Labor 
Gender and vulnerable groups









The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX III // COMPREHENSIVE METHODOLOGY SCHEME The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
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HALT license distribution to reclamation and dredging projects in coastal areas (with the exception of 
public good projects and affordable housing developments) until a strategic master plan is developed by 
competent authorities for the Kingdom of Bahrain 
Sample of Parlimentary Inquiry Committee Recommendations Regarding Reclamation Encroachment on Coastal Areas  
Recommendation Status 
CREATE a unified device for the issuance of reclamation and dredging licenses while detailing the extent 
and locations of said activities; Monitoring and evaluation of activities will be assigned to the Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Agriculture 
THE STATE shall be held accountable for the implementaion of Law No. (20) for the year 2006 in regards 
to the protection of beaches of coastal areas, which prohibits the alteration of coastal areas completely
OPEN up no less than 50% of reclaimed privatized coastlines to the public 
PROTECT what remains of maritime areas for coming generations and prohibit its alteration for any 
reason but in service of the public good
THE DIRECTORATE of Fisheries shall enforce its legal duty detailed in Law No. (50) for the year 2002 
by establishing a general committee for the protection of Marine Resouces 
INVOLVE municipal entities and marine protection organizations in the decision making process of 
reclamation and dredging of sea areas
INTRODUCE legal action in the effort of holding parties responsible for the damaging of marine 
resource while compensating fishermen immediately and with a fair amount for damages endured by 
them due to reclamation and dredging; establish compensation banks and environmental restoration 
efforts to areas negatively impacted by reclamation 
DEVELOP and implement a comprehensive strategy to protect and cultivate marine resources 
throughout the Kingdom of Bahrain; establish a contibutaroy company for fish farming and train 
fishermen in this field 
IMPLEMENT the Ministry of Trade's toolkit for dredging and reclamation in all future projects 
DEFINE areas of potential reclamation and dredging by a comprehensive survery of sand areas in 
regional waters to determine the amount and quality of sand available in Bahrain's water; define and 
protect important biological habitats for marine resources 
TIGHTEN government oversight of reclamation and dredging activities and seek the help of reliable 
consulting companies to monitor and ensure all procedures have been followed (Note: investors will bear 
the additional costs of these requirements)
DEMAND the sale of sands on private and public actors as revenue for the Kingdom's treasury 
IMPLEMENT and activate all laws and regulations created for reclamation and dredging; update laws 
periodically 
MAKE necessary funds available for minotoring parties by providing the appropriate devices to monitor 
and oversee reclamation projects (before and after) 
IMPLEMENT and activate the third strategy of Bahrain's Master Plan to proect and support marine 
resources
UPDATE marine maps for the Kingdom of Bahrain every five years to reflect all effective changes on 
land mass
ESTABLISH a Marine Research Center under Bahrain's Center for Data and Research [no longer exists] 
responsible for land surveying and the collection of all marine datasets; provide a budget for all research 
activities 
THE STATE shall refer all illegal reclamation and dredging projects to Public Prosecution, enforcing 
Law No. (20.4) for the year 2006
EXECUTE Law No. (9.B.11) from the Constitution, preventing the sale of any reclaimed land to either 
party except through the legislature 
THE STATE shall respond to all recommendations provided in this report within two months of its 
production 
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
APPENDIX VI // PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTATION OF RECLAMATION The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
Fishermen getting ready to leave for daily fishing trip
Fishermen preparing ships for daily fishing trip
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particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
fishing industry / land / reclamation / state 
selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
Fishermen leaving for daily fishing trip on a speed boat
Fisherman making a set of ‘huthoor’ 
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particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
XV // ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Profes-
sor Clara Irazabal, and reader, Professor Jyoti 
Hosagrahar, for their guidance and consistent 
drive throughout this process. I would also like 
to acknowledge the Board at the Professional 
Society of Fishermen in Bahrain for their 
accommodation and provision of interviews, 
and their members for the significant insight 
shared about their experiences within the 
fishing industry. Many thanks and apprecia-
tion to my parents, who supported me both 
emotionally and academically in any way they 
could, and to my fellow classmates at GSAPP 
who were pivotal in helping me craft my 
framework and ideas.
Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
II // INTRODUCTION 
State failure, a rare phenomenon in the modern 
world, is often trailed with fraught research 
intended to explain the particular complexities 
of government and system collapse. However, 
the early examination of precursors leading up 
to state failure provides theorists and planners 
alike an opportunity for mitigated response; it 
can amend a failing or weak state, preventing 
the total collapse of the economic and political 
system. 
The Kingdom of Bahrain finds itself in this 
critical stage. The establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in 2001 was welcomed by 
hope and expectation, marking the beginning 
of a new relationship between state and civil 
society. However, less than a decade later, the 
country finds itself at its weakest and most 
unstable state since independence. According 
to the Funds for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index 
(FSI), a United-States backed non-profit think 
tank which publishes a worldwide ranking 
system based on national risk indicators, 
Bahrain ranked within the 70th percentile for 
vengeance-seeking group grievance, illegiti-
macy of the state, rise of factionalized elites, 
and the violation of human rights and the rule 
of law in 2013 (FFP, 2013). By many measures, 
the state is weakening. However, a critical 
understanding of the role of planning in the 
creation of state and civil society relations can 
introduce immediate interventions can be 
implemented to remedy public tensions. 
To do so, the research considers a case study of 
land reclamation policies and their effective 
impacts on fishing communities in Bahrain, a 
microcosm of the state and civil society 
relationship. Fishermen communities were 
I // ABSTRACT 
Civil unrest and dissident behavior are often identi-
fied in literature as strong indicators of a failing 
state. This relationship is observed globally, such as 
in the case of ongoing public strife in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain. The uprisings that took place through-
out the Arab Spring have continued to the present 
day, begging the question: what conditions 
produced the current relationship between state and 
society? The following study investigates this 
question through the lens of state-led land reclama-
tion policies and their impacts on fishermen 
communities, an indigenous faction of Bahraini 
civil society. As the case study suggests, while 
reclamation plans have ensured both economic and 
industrial growth for the state, they inevitably 
caused detrimental economic and social losses to an 
already disadvantaged community within society. 
The failure in planning, however, portrays a bleaker 
image of the government’s inability and unwilling-
ness to respond to civic complaints regarding public 
planning projects, leading to a consequential trans-
formation of the fishing industry and, with that, its 
labor market. More importantly, the neglectful 
nature of state policies produced amplified mistrust 
within the fishermen communities, creating a 
vicious cycle of uncooperative behavior. Using the 
research as a microcosm of state planning provides 
a framework for understanding the reciprocal 
relationship between the polity and its citizens. The 
failure of planning in Bahrain, from process to 
action, explains the current weakening of the state. 
As such, the study recommends - in addition to 
community-based initiatives - that immediate 
efforts be directed towards a response to the 
demands and concerns of society, thereby address-
ing the critical relationship of state and civil society. 
Keywords // Bahrain / civil society / fishermen / 
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selected as the study group because they were 
specifically identified in the Report of the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
as one of the many disenfranchised communi-
ties that formed the opposition platform 
during the Arab Spring in Bahrain. While 
individuals and groups involved in the 
protests varied, their call for government trans-
parency, a reorganization of the sociopolitical 
environment, and an end to corrupt dealings 
were unanimously heard. Most importantly, 
however, was the call for reprioritizing state 
service for the public good (Bassiouni, 2011). 
This breakdown, echoed by numerous factions 
of civil society, indicates that government 
operations in Bahrain are no longer working. 
By using following study, several answers are 
being addressed: What function did the state 
play in the creation of effectual plans? What 
role did community members play throughout 
the planning process? How have they respond-
ed to planning failure? Finally, what implica-
tions does planning failure have on the current 
situation of Bahrain?
III // BACKGROUND 
Coastal cities have historically been described 
as the ‘motors for national prosperity’ - mag-
nets for people, employment, and opportuni-
ties (Kolman, 2012). To many countries, that 
strategic geography stressed the need for 
heavy development investments in these 
regions. While development has been a part of 
national agendas for centuries, the mecha-
nisms through which it is created, promoted, 
and spatially planned for have significantly 
progressed with time and technology. As the 
world enters the age of competitive globaliza-
tion, the means to attain development are 
considered by some countries as a transaction-
al cost of planning. As such, environmental, 
political, social, and economical values are 
often times bypassed on the road towards the 
light at the end of the development tunnel. 
One opportunity for development comes in the 
form of land reclamation and dredging: the 
process of creating new land by burying ocean, 
lake, or river waters. The process has become a 
popular method for expansion in island geog-
raphies and peninsulas, particularly those in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Kolman, 
2012). Bahrain provides a case example of such 
investments in development, which has seen 
its land mass increase by over 15% in the last 
seventy years due to land reclamation activi-
ties (MEST, 2007). While the country has seen 
correlated GDP and industry growth following 
these territorial expansions into the Arabian 
Gulf, the impacts of such methods beyond 
economic revitalization remain unaddressed 
(Naser et al., 2008). 
In an era of globalizing cities and technological 
booms, traditional and artisanal trades such as 
fishing often get left behind in strategic plan-
ning initiatives. This paper investigates the 
socioeconomic impacts of land reclamation on 
one particular faction of civil society: the 
fishing community. As will be discussed 
below, the fishing industry in Bahrain, once an 
explosive trade, has since been in decline due 
to a multitude of factors - some environmental, 
some political. Today, fishermen occupy one of 
the lowest socioeconomic standings in the 
nation and have consistently been disenfran-
chised through economic and political means, 
largely due to a failure in reclamation policies 
and practices (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012). The 
thesis argues that governmental development 
policies have not only failed to account for the 
significant economic and social losses of land 
reclamation activities on fishing communities 
but have also excluded said communities from 
participating in the planning process. The 
approach through which land reclamation has 
been conducted has created long-term tensions 
between these already disenfranchised 
factions of society and local authorities, 
providing one explanation for the weakening 
state of Bahrain.  
The case study is critical to planning in Bahrain 
as it discusses four crucial issues - a) the plan-
ning process in Bahrain, particularly the 
presence of public participation within plan-
ning forums; b) the antithetical consequences 
of ‘good planning’ from the lens of social and 
economic impacts; c) the impacts of develop-
ment on a disenfranchised community within 
the Bahraini class strata; and d) the implica-
tions this particular type of failure in planning 




The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 
approximately 40 low-lying islands. The 
largest of the islands is Bahrain, the main 
island wherein daily life takes place. The 
islands of Bahrain are surrounded by shallow 
waters, ranging between 0.5 and 30 meters 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total land area has 
been significantly altered following the discov-
ery of oil in the 1930s, when Bahrain witnessed 
a shift in the economic and social structure of 
its urban settlement system and land use 
patterns (MEST, 2007). 
Comparing Bahrain in the 1950s to Bahrain 
today, the country identifiers would hardly be 
recognizable. What used to be a country of a 
little over 100,000 people is now a country of 
over 1.3 million. Bahrain, the first member 
country of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to discover oil in the early 1930s, 
accounts 60% of its current export receipts to 
petroleum production and refining. While still 
significantly higher than other state revenues, 
the percentage represents a 10% drop in 
revenue collection since the early 1980s. The 
decrease can be attributed to the diminishing 
oil resources in the country, declining at a rate 
of 6% annually since the early 1970s (Moham-
med, 2006; Looney, 1994). Confronted with the 
reality of oil resource depletion, the govern-
ment of Bahrain implemented reactive policies 
of industrial development and portfolio diver-
sification in the mid eighties aimed at strength-
ening the financial capital of the country. The 
policy focused on developing a few new indus-
tries, including aluminum manufacturing, 
finance, and construction (MEST, 2007). Infra-
structure and investments were poured into 
these new industries, and, in just sixty years, 
the population grew eleven times its size 
(Table I). Within this time period, the social 
fabric of the nation also changed. Over the past 
ten years, Bahrain has seen an overturn in the 
resident majority. Foreigners now comprise 
54% of the nation’s population, while Bahrain-
is occupied a mere 46%. 
These demographic shifts have resulted in 
developmental choices that have in turn 
altered the framework and fabric of planning 
in Bahrain. The rate of construction has 
dramatically increased and, with the lack of 
publicly available land, development expand-
ed into the sea. Nearly all infrastructure devel-
oped for the new finance and manufacturing 
industries were all built on reclaimed land. 
Such examples include the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour, Durrat al-Bahrain, Amwaj, 
Lulu-towers, and Lulu Island. With vast land 
reclamation projects underway, Bahrain’s 
physical form was significantly transformed 
(Zainal et al., 2012). The total area dedicated to 
the listed developments alone has now exceed-
ed 10 square kilometers (MEST, 2007). These 
territorial extensions have been developed 
with little to no formal land-use plans or 
zoning codes in place, creating further tension 
between public municipalities and neighbor-
ing residents. For one, ocean shore land values 
decrease and seashore access is disrupted 
(Sheppard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the contentious development 
choices made by officials for the sake of 
economic growth have become a central issue 
in the Bahraini uprising of 2011, and are still 
being protested today (Bassiouni, 2011). 
The Fishing Industry 
The industry most affected by land reclama-
tion activities in Bahrain has been the fishing 
industry. Fishing, a traditional and historic 
industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
comprised a significant proportion of the 
nation’s exports since the early 1930s (FAO, 
2006). The rich surrounding waters have 
provided fishermen with access to over 200 
different fish varieties, distinguishing the 
industry from neighboring countries and 
establishing it as a leading revenue source in 
the rising gross national product (Musayqar, 
1988). Since the 1980s, total fish landings had 
tripled to nearly 14,489 tons of fish products in 
2004, valued at around 9.60 million Bahraini 
Dinars (US $3.63 million). Nearly all fisheries 
in Bahrain are artisanal in nature, following the 
elimination of industrial fisheries in 1998 
(FAO, 2006; Directorate of Fisheries [DOF], 
2006). To date, there are no plans for 
large-scale industrial fisheries. However, due 
to the variation in hydrological parameters and 
the minute size of Bahrain’s territorial water, a 
number of fish species can only be found in 
Bahrain’s waters seasonally. Bahraini fisher-
men are thus forced into sharing their fish 
stock with other countries in the region (FAO, 
2006; Musayqar, 1988). 
Ecological Impacts 
The ecological impacts of land reclamation 
contributed to further reductions in the 
already limited fish supply. With landmass 
growing by nearly 91 square kilometers in the 
last few decades - 13% of the original landmass 
in the 1960s – several tons of fine marine 
sediment had to be removed to make way for 
large infrastructure projects. This removal 
affected the natural temperatures and salinity 
of the Gulf’s ocean water (Naser, 2011; Shep-
pard et al., 2010; Zainal et al., 2012). Literature 
assessing the impacts of reclamation use 
macrobenthic assemblages and experiments as 
tools to detect environmental shifts in the 
ecosystem. These tests revealed “sand and 
mud characterized by lower levels of biodiver-
sity and abundance are extracted from borrow 
areas within the territorial waters of Bahrain 
then dumped into coastal and subtidal areas 
characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and productivity” (Naser, 2011). The changes 
translate into a significant loss in biodiversity 
and productivity. 
Reclamation projects have also employed 
destructive means for the development of land, 
such as the dredging of sea-grass and algal 
beds in construction, causing the permanent 
loss of sub-tidal and inter-tidal nursery 
grounds where abundant fish and shellfish 
catches were found (Sheppard et al., 2010). It 
wasn’t until 1992 that Bahrain enacted its first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement for reclamation proposals, 
decades after land was initially reclaimed. 
Since then, all EIA reports for reclamation 
projects were assessed as borderline quality (C 
and D ratings) or poor quality (E and F 
ratings), yet the developments were approved 
nonetheless (Naser et al., 2008). The cumula-
tive impacts of reclamation activities have 
resulted in the depopulation of fish across the 
Gulf, particularly within fishing grounds in 
Bahrain’s waters (Zainal et al., 2012). 
The ecological impacts of reclamation are 
shared amongst the region as a whole. Signifi-
cant economic and ecological losses have been 
documented in Gulf nations, decreasing the 
net economic value of the goods and services 
obtained from the Gulf marine environment, a 
market with an annual net worth of nearly US 
$1.90 billion (Sheppard, 2007). Furthermore, 
reclamation affects the island’s groundwater 
resources, resulting in rising water levels, 
incursions of seawater, and the rising salinity 
of agricultural soils. This in turn makes a lot of 
groundwater unsuitable for agricultural or 
domestic use, reducing agricultural activities 
and restricting spatial population distribution. 
In Bahrain, these effects have been linked to 
reductions in indigenous food production and 
increasing food imports (Al-Madany et al., 
1991).  Nevertheless, the brunt of these conse-
quences has undeniably been unequally 
shared amongst the population. 
Documented Impacts 
Biologists and environmental academics in 
Bahrain have documented the impacts of land 
reclamation over the past two decades. This 
study is meant to add on and update what has 
been discovered by researchers in Bahrain on 
the economic implications of reclamation 
projects on fishermen while also documenting 
the lesser-observed social considerations. The 
most notable example of literature within the 
Bahraini context is in Dr. Ismail Al-Madany’s 
1991 paper Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and 
Reclamation. Al-Madany largely explores the 
socioeconomic impacts of reclamation activi-
ties on the local population, identifying fisher-
men communities as the most adversely affect-
ed factions of society. Due to the loss of fish 
supply, catch rates have significantly been 
lowered. Such reductions have already been 
noted by local fishermen who have sent formal 
complaints to governmental institutions about 
the observed impacts of dredging. Statistic 
reports for 1987 shows that “catch from barrier 
traps, line and hooks have registered a decline 
of 29.2% and 34.0%” respectively, within a 
single year (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
decline in catch rates has translated into signif-
icant declines in net annual incomes, and an 
increase in unemployment within the indus-
try. Fishermen have seen an eighty percent 
decline in their income due to land reclamation 
activities (Hattam, 2009). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the fishing 
industry provided employment for around 
4.35% of the total working population, or 
10.5% of the Bahraini working population. 
That amounts to nearly 30,000 citizens 
employed in the fishing industry, a number 
that is slowly diminishing due partially to 
excavation and reclamation activities. The 
industry’s decline has led to a worsening of the 
balance of payments in Bahrain. Fish imports 
used to account for only 39% of total fish 
consumption in 1983, but the percentage has 
been slowly rising (Al-Madany et al., 1991). 
The government has since attempted to 
remedy the situation through subsidies and by 
distributing more fishing licenses (DOF, 2006). 
The successfulness of such solutions will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The social impacts of land reclamation have 
been studied to a very limited degree in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, a review in the early 
nineties highlighted the inability to make ends 
meet due to lost income as a factor influencing 
the extension of fishing activities past Bahraini 
waters. This has caused physical safety threats 
to local fishermen. News reports have consis-
tently shown a growing number of cases 
whereby fishermen were either shot at, arrest-
ed, or detained for questioning when they 
trespass onto foreign waters (TNN, 2012; 
Mahdi, 2010). 
Fishermen Communities 
An already disenfranchised group within the 
Bahraini social stratosphere, fishermen - who 
rely on access to open waters for employment 
and income purposes - are experiencing great 
direct and indirect economic and social 
impacts as a result of reclamation. These villag-
es include, most notably, Sitra, Bandar Dar, 
Al-Zallaq, Al-Duraz, Ras Rayeh, Jaw, Al-Mal-
keeyah, Jiddhafs, Bilad Al-Qadeem, Muharraq 
and Manama East (Map I). While literature has 
extensively discussed the economic impacts of 
reclamation on the industry as a whole, thus 
far, no report has focused specifically on the 
consequential impacts on fishermen in Bahrain 
(DOF, 2006). 
This research investigates the socioeconomic 
impacts of land reclamation on fishermen 
using a combination of academic papers, new 
reports, analysis of ministry documents, archi-
val research and primary data. By exploring 
the conditions through which reclamation 
policies affected fishermen communities, an 
interpolated explanation of the current politi-
cal economy of the country is derived.
IV // CASE STUDIES 
The history of modern land reclamation dates 
back to the early twentieth century, with the 
first major reclamation project taking place in 
Rotterdam, Netherland. The project expanded 
the Port of Rotterdam to accommodate for 
more ships and container terminals. With the 
perceived value the extension brought to 
Europe, including the provision of more jobs 
and economic development, countries around 
the world began replicating the process. In 
1975, the government of Singapore reclaimed 
nearly 40 million cubic meters of sea area to 
build the new Changi airport. Hong Kong’s 
Chek Lap Kok airport was built using similar 
means. In the 1980s, investments were put into 
innovations in dredging technologies, leading 
to the production of machinery that made land 
reclamation cheaper and faster (Kolman, 2012).
As the techniques improved, so did national 
interests. By the turn of the century, the largest 
reclamation projects began to emerge in the 
Middle East. Governments bought into the 
belief that reclaimed land was, economically 
speaking, less expensive and more profitable 
than ‘old’ land. The cost of reclamation equat-
ed to around US $0.80 per square foot, while 
the land sold for US $8.00 or US $8.50 per 
square foot (Al-Madany et al., 1991). The 
technology not only allowed for states to seek 
economic rent off reclaimed land, but it also 
tested the laws of neoclassical economics 
which proclaimed that the supply of land 
available for housing or office buildings is 
inelastic (Arestis and Sawyer, 2013). A global 
analysis of land reclamation activities has since 
been produced, with literature ranging from 
scholarly articles to archival research and 
observational studies. Of such work, two 
particular case studies best represent the trajec-
tory of reclamation and development in 
Bahrain: Mumbai, India and Batam, Indonesia. 
Mumbai, India
Land reclamation in Mumbai has a history of 
over 300 years, with the largest number of 
reclamations taking place in the past four 
decades. The development, however, has 
happened in an “unplanned and unrestrained 
manner” (Deshmane, 2013), inviting criticism 
and controversy. The haphazard and unscien-
tific measures prescribed to reclamation activi-
ties in the mega-metropolis, alongside the 
increased build-up within the area, have 
adversely impacted the city’s ecology - particu-
larly its coastline (Deshmane, 2013). A large 
percentage of land reclaimed from the sea took 
place between the 1970s and 2012, some of 
which was obtained through illegal means, 
causing social and political controversies in the 
area (Deshmane, 2013). Literature on Mumbai 
has failed to detail the social and economic 
costs of reclamation activities. Currently, the 
Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) 
- a government-run think tank in the state - is 
conducting a four-part study on Land Recla-
mation in Mumbai. MTSU will not only be 
analyzing the environmental impacts of the 
100+ years of reclamation in Mumbai, but it 
will also be analyzing the socioeconomic 
impacts on neighboring communities and how 
reclamation has affected the sociology, culture, 




The northern coasts of Batam, particularly the 
coastal areas of the Bengkong Laut, Sadai and 
Tanjung Buntung sub-districts, have been the 
focus of reclamation research in Indonesia. 
Studies focused on documenting the physical, 
chemical, and biological changes in the envi-
ronment as well as socioeconomic changes of 
fishery productivity, income levels, and gener-
al fishermen lifestyles. The case study is signifi-
cant due to the comparable complications 
inscribed into the implementation processes of 
reclamation policies. These include the expo-
nential population increases in Batam, the 
prioritization of development as a response to 
the population growth patterns and 
land-shortage problems, and the types of 
projects developed on reclaimed land. Recla-
mation activities began in 2004, but were set up 
with environmental requirements and 
constraints so as to avoid any significant 
damage to the area. Post-development analysis 
proved, however, that reclamation activities 
had considerable impacts on the natural 
morphology of coastal areas, particularly in 
the reduction in local mangroves and reefs, 
increased rates of flooding, and diminishing 
rates of fish productivity (Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). Once again, the research failed to 
account for the social and economic impacts of 
development on the labor market. While there 
was brief mention of profession shifting and 
diversification due to the loss of fish catch, the 
study lacked a thorough analysis of the 
economic and social impacts it set out to 
uncover (Priyandes & Majid, 2009).
V // LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Impact Assessment 
The economic impacts of development projects 
are commonly quantified through a time series 
industry analysis. It analyzes the costs and 
benefits of a project or policy on a local econo-
my using industry data. While this study is 
interested in the impacts experienced by the 
labor market, variables used to measure indus-
try changes can still be used employed for 
analyses. Fisheries sustainability and manage-
ment reports have previously considered the 
change in productivity rates, catch rates, fish 
consumption, number of vessels, number of 
fishers, quantity and value of production, and 
industry subsidies to measure the response of 
industry to catalysts. These indicators are then 
used for post-evaluation management initia-
tives impacts, assessment of progress towards 
long-term goals, and the assessment of fisher-
ies impacts (Le Gallic, 2002). The study compli-
cates these simple measurements, however, by 
isolating a single variable - land reclamation 
activities – to measure the impacts of said 
activities. For the purposes of this research, 
variables will be limited to indicators that have 
been explicitly linked to reclamation activities 
in literature and academia: catch rates, vessel 
numbers, employment, and fish production 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). By considering each independent and 
dependent variable relationship as isolated 
cases, the economic impacts of land reclama-
tion activities can be better assessed. 
While the literature quantifying the economic 
impacts of land reclamation is limited in its 
breadth, the methodologies used to measure 
the impacts are more rigorously detailed. 
Overall, methodologies consisted of three 
approaches: a) explorative approaches to 
receive information about environmental and 
social conditions of fishermen communities in 
study areas; b) comparative approaches of 
environmental and social conditions before 
and after reclamation and to indicate the 
changes specific to dredging activities 
(Priyandes & Majid, 2009); and c) spatial 
approaches to analyze fisheries management 
and location-based data on fishing vessels 
utilization, economic forecasts, and fish statis-
tics (Al-A’ali et al., 1996). Primary data on 
economic and social conditions were collected 
through a combination of field observation, 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders such as local fishermen organiza-
tions and local governments. Questionnaire 
sampling was conducted by distributing 
surveys to 89 villagers in the affected areas. 
The questions included in the surveys used 
mainly comparative approaches and anecdotal 
evidence to gauge the economic and social 
conditions before and after reclamation activi-
ties. Explorative approaches employed inter-
views to gather information on relevant 
current environmental, economic, and social 
data on fisheries and fishermen (Priyandes & 
Majid, 2009). 
Social Impact Assessment 
Literature concerning the social impacts of 
development planning has often time been 
overlooked, especially as it pertains to land 
reclamation activities. Though not much detail 
has gone into analyzing the consequences of 
unemployment, academics have noted that 
‘psychological, social, and cultural problems’ 
have arisen within fishing communities due to 
an inability of supporting one’s family, anxiety 
over job security, and disempowerment 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991; Priyandes & Majid, 
2009). For that reason, this research defines the 
dependent variables of the research using a 
general guideline for social impact assessment. 
The International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) describes social impact 
assessment as “the processes of analyzing, 
monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive 
and negative, of planned interventions (poli-
cies, programs, plans, and projects) and any 
social change processes invoked by those inter-
ventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical 
and human environment” (Vanclay, 2003). 
Given that the region has no specific standards 
for measuring the social impacts of develop-
ment projects, international categories provide 
the foundation. These include changes in: 
crime and social order, culture and customs, 
community health and safety, labor, gender 
and vulnerable groups, and human rights and 
security (Franks, 2012). The list is described in 
more detail in the appendix attached (Appen-
dix I). Cross-listing these categories with the 
current context of fishing communities in 
Bahrain, the independent variables most 
appropriate were chosen for analysis (Appen-
dix II).
Public Participation in Planning
An assumption was built into the research 
regarding a failure in implementing a public 
participation component into reclamation 
practices (Al-Madany et al., 1991; Naser et al., 
2008). For that reason, understanding what can 
be gained from public participation within 
planning becomes a critical piece of the litera-
ture review. Public participation has been an 
integral part of adaptation processes for over 
decades now, and the development of partici-
patory methodologies has specifically focused 
on the inclusion and incorporation of local 
community perceptions into the planning 
process. The public component in processes of 
urban change has become an integral compo-
nent of planning literature, and planning with-
out a participatory element is considered a 
failure on many accounts (Moser & Stein, 
2011). It further raises questions on legality of 
land use within a state (Fakhro, 2013; Larson, 
1998). Academics have stressed the importance 
of recognizing community members’ voices 
and priorities, whereas truly participatory 
methods expand beyond individual surveys 
and household questionnaires - they are 
“based on purposive sample from a range of 
focus groups that are representative of 
community members in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, economic activities and other cultur-
ally specific variables” (Moser & Stein, 2011). 
The principles of participatory methodology 
include the reversal of learning, rapid and 
progressive learning, plural investigation, 
embracing diversity, facilitation by local 
people, a sharing of information, group based 
contribution, and empowerment (Chambers, 
1994). The techniques can be applied to various 
social, political, environmental and economic 
problems within urban contexts so long as they 
are adapted to address each distinct concern 
(Moser & Stein, 2011).
Trust 
A particularly compelling aspect of the social 
costs of development is measured through the 
lens of trust. Neglecting to account for public 
participation in planning can be attributed to 
schematic failure; however, denying commu-
nities the opportunity for public input on 
government-led projects or excluding certain 
members from voicing concerns can frequently 
translate into governmental mistrust and 
perceptions of public betrayal (Fainstein, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Locke, 2001; Phelan, 2006). 
The theory behind credible government policy 
hangs on the ability of governments to “make 
and keep promises”: an ability that has yet to 
be proven in many nations (Phelan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, higher levels of generalized trust 
between state and civil society are critical for 
cooperation and future growth (Rotberg, 
2004). 
Trust has been commonly and generally 
defined as the “expectation concerning the 
behavior of others” (Lukas & Walgenbach, 
2010). The provision of trust allows for the 
prediction of party behaviors, and the reaction 
therein. Put simply, trust is calculated coopera-
tion (Lukas & Walgenbach, 2010). Moreover, 
the lack of trust - or spread of distrust - dictates 
a course of action based on feelings of suspi-
cion. When encountered on a systemic level, 
such as between citizens and government, 
dysfunction and uncooperative behavior 
ensue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
Literature has further complicated the defini-
tion of trust by categorizing it into four main 
variables: rational-calculative trust, interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions and abstract 
systems, and trust in values or norms (Tait, 
2011). Of these, the most abstract form is the 
trust in institutions because it associates itself 
more with expert systems rather than individ-
ual calculation. That in turn has vast implica-
tions on professional work: competence, open-
ness, concern for others, and reliability become 
requirements for trustworthy institutions (Tait, 
2011). Without the fulfillment of these require-
ments in public fields like planning, a fragmen-
tation in society might arise, leading to frustra-
tion and antagonism. In Bahrain, centralized 
and top-down government policies on devel-
opment have been negatively received as such 
by low income communities who bear the 
brunt of negative externalities of projects. This 
has been documented in great detail through 
the events leading up to the Bahrain uprising 
of February 2011. Discontent surrounding 
governmental policies and planning processes 
have affected several disenfranchised groups 
throughout the Kingdom, including workers 
in the fishing industry (Bassiouni, 2011). 
Considerable literature has been produced on 
measuring trust and government betrayal. 
Previous conceptions of trust have evaluated it 
using static and mechanistic methods, which 
produce overly pessimistic predictions about 
the potential of creating trust in situations 
where “the favorable conditions and/or 
prerequisites supposedly underlying trust do 
not exist” (Locke, 2001). For that reason, 
contemporary literature has focused on the use 
of game theory as a way of measuring trust, 
particularly institutional trust (Carpenter et al., 
2006; Glaeser et al., 2000; Phelan, 2006). The 
study most relevant to the background and 
context of Bahrain is that conducted by 
Carpenter et al. (2006) on space, trust, and 
communal action in Southeast Asia. The 
research examines the spatial dimensions of 
trust in two cities using field experiment data 
conducted in low-income communities. Exper-
imental games were designed to model the 
behavior of community members in reaction to 
state policies, with identifiers collected to make 
conclusions on the state of trust amongst 
individuals (Carpenter et al., 2006). While the 
study successfully details the use of game 
theory to measure trust, it does so on an 
individual level. Should a collective trend be 
measured, the identifiers will become less 
central to the game. 
VI // RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study employs various methodologies in 
assessing the impact of land reclamation on 
fishing communities in Bahrain (Appendix III). 
In developing a critical narrative of planning, 
the research was divided into three questions. 
First, what are the measurable economic trans-
formations in the industry and the on the labor 
force? Second, what are the tangible social 
impacts on fishermen? Third, how have the 
combined socioeconomic impacts shaped the 
tensions between state and civil society? In an 
attempt to address the questions at hand, the 
study identifies a combination of dependent 
variables to investigate (Table II).
VII // DATA SOURCES
Data on total land area reclaimed, environ-
mental impact assessment processes, and 
general planning and development procedures 
were obtained through state documents and 
public research. Data on the specific social and 
economic impacts was gathered through a 
combination of industry documents, surveys, 
interviews, photographic documentation, 
archival research, and experimental games. 
Industry Statistics 
The proposed methodology uses industry 
statistics to analyze the relationship reclama-
tion has to income, employment, and catch 
rates. The Directorate of Fisheries (DOF) 
Annual Fishery Statistics Report (AFSR) 
provided the longitudinal data used to evalu-
ate the aforementioned variables. Economic 
impacts were thus broken down to Catch per 
Unit Effort (CPUE), total number of fishing 
boats in Bahrain by year, an estimated number 
of total Bahraini and foreign fishermen by year, 
import and export rates, and total fish land-
ings, and wholesale value (BD millions). Since 
reclamation is not the only factor affecting the 
fishing industry, interview and survey 
responses are incorporated into the analysis to 
better direct the framing of the question and 
internal conflicts inherent in the planning 
process.
Surveys and Interviews 
From December 2013 to January 2014, organi-
zational leaders and local fishermen were 
interviewed. The former category includes 
representatives of groups with technical 
knowledge about reclamation activities in 
Bahrain. Organizations included the High 
Council of the Environment (HCE), the Hous-
ing Policies and Strategic Planning Directorate 
(HPSPD), and the Directorate of Fisheries 
(DOF). Seven in depth interviews were 
conducted with local stakeholders and organi-
zational leaders regarding the perceived 
outcomes of reclamation, the planning process, 
the fishing industry, and development in 
Bahrain.
Interviews and surveys were conducted with 
local fishermen through the Bahrain Society for 
Professional Fishermen (BSPF), a member-
ship-based organization for artisanal and 
licensed fishermen, between December 31st 
and January 15th. A total of ninety-two mem-
bers responded to the survey, which included 
a set of closed-ended questions regarding the 
perceived transformation in monthly income, 
fishing trips, and physical safety following 
mass reclamation activities. Surveys also 
collected information on compensation and 
direct engagement with fishermen throughout 
the planning process.  To fairly balance the 
qualitative data received about the effects of 
planning failure, on-site interviews were 
conducted with fishermen unassociated with 
BSPF at local loading docks on January 12th, 
13th, and 14th. In total, ten fishermen were 
interviewed but all personal identifiers were 
left undisclosed for the sake of anonymity. 
Since the majority of fishermen do not speak 
English, all interviews and surveys were 
conducted in Arabic - the local language.  
Experimental Games 
Given the current political instability of the 
state, the study refrained from attempting to 
measure trust or the relationship between 
community members and the government in 
explicit and simplistic means (interviews and 
surveys). Addressing these issues with no 
personal relationship between the researcher 
and the fishermen would raise several red flags 
and the results obtained are susceptible to 
biases. For that reason, and to measure the 
intangible long-term social impacts, three 
rounds of experimental games were developed 
by the researcher (Appendix IV). The game is 
designed to measure the level of institutional 
trust community members currently have in 
their engagement with the state in a more 
implicit way. Game specifics were modeled 
after other experimental games in literature - 
namely, Carpenter et. al (2006) - and economic 
trust theories, as discussed in the literature 
review. Game specifics will be detailed in the 
following chapters.
In total, twenty-six fishermen participated in 
the experimental games aimed at measuring 
cooperation with and trust of the government. 
Logistics regression was used to evaluate the 
impact of various demographic factors on the 
results. A follow-up interview was voluntarily 
conducted with ten of the participants after a 
degree of comfort was achieved between the 
researcher and the participants to better under-
stand what factors influenced their decision 
making. The combination of data obtained 
from the games was then interpolated to 
explain the state and civil society dynamics in 
Bahrain leading up to the uprising. 
VIII // RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Given the timeframe, international site of 
research, and cultural sensitivity, certain 
research limitations emerged in data collection 
and fieldwork. One must note that the King-
dom of Bahrain is still in a state of political 
instability, and fear of prosecution guaranteed 
a relatively small sample size of interviews and 
game participants. Of those that did partici-
pate, answers to questions were either 
prefaced with disclaimers on personal views or 
were too vague to address the heart of the 
matter. Guaranteeing fishermen complete 
anonymity was essential in obtaining useful 
information for the analysis. 
Secondary data regarding the economic 
performance of the fishing industry and 
employment within it were too onerous to 
procure due to state confidentiality and thus 
had to be omitted from the research. Similarly, 
GIS shapefiles and databases were not avail-
able for public use, so all research maps made 
use of state-released datafiles. Finally, due to 
the limited timeframe and budget of the 
researcher, survey data was collected at the 
BSPF’s general meeting, clearly excluding 
segments of the labor market that are unaffili-
ated with the organization from participating. 
To overcome these biases in research, in-depth 
interviews with fishermen were conducted 
on-site so as to include the views of multiple 
representatives within the industry. 
Finally, the research acknowledges the difficul-
ty of interpolating the experiences of a relative-
ly small population to draw conclusions about 
the larger state and civil society tension. How-
ever, the results of the experimental game 
supplemented with qualitative statements can 
serve as a proxy for macrocosmic extrapola-
tions.
IX // FINDINGS 
Survey Summary 
During the five weeks spent in Bahrain, nine-
ty-two surveys of fishermen were collected. To 
ensure a variety of fishermen were represented 
in the results, the surveys were conducted in a 
combination of port visits between the hours of 
5 A.M. and 8 A.M. as well as through the 
Society of Professional Fishermen in Bahrain, 
the largest union of fishermen on the island. 
Fishermen represented in the survey were 
based in Sitra, Manama, Al-Budaiya, 
Muharraq, Al-Dair, Al-Hidd, Karzakan, Askar, 
Al-Malkiya, Al-Samaheej, Janusan, and Al-Zal-
laq (Map II). Professional experience in the 
trade ranged from 15 years to 49 years, with a 
mean of 24.9 years. Respondents indicated a 
variety of reasons as to why they are still in the 
trade, with the majority pointing to fishing 
being an ancestral trade and a genuine love for 
the profession. 
When asked about the effects of reclamation on 
the fishing profession, a general consensus 
emerged among respondents. On a scale of 1 to 
5, with 5 being very negative and 1 being very 
positive, an overwhelming 89.1% described the 
impacts of reclamation as very negative, with 
the other 10.9% describing it as negative. 
Inability to provide for one’s family, the need 
to fish outside legal regional borders, the need 
to change fishing locations, and a diminishing 
income are just some of the major effects of 
land reclamation on fishermen surveyed in the 
study. Alarmingly, all but one of the respon-
dents reported receiving no compensation, 
and all ninety-two fishermen said that they 
were not consulted or included in the planning 
process of reclamation projects. Moreover, 
94.6% saw the planning and production of 
these projects as being illegal. When asked if 
leaving the profession was an option, 16.3% of 
respondents indicated that they would consid-
er it but, given their skill sets and available 
opportunities, it would not be a wise endeavor 
to pursue. 
Economic Impacts 
As documented in previous sections, the envi-
ronmental damage resulting from the gratu-
itous and inefficient practices of land reclama-
tion goes uncontested within the discourse of 
academic and planning institutions; this is no 
different in Bahrain. However, the associated 
damage has had significant ramifications on 
the fishing industry and, hence, fishermen 
throughout the country. Total fish landings 
throughout the past several years have seen 
considerable reductions, dropping from 8,291 
metric tons in 2004 to 5,913 metric tons in 2012 
(Figure I). Simultaneously, catch rates (kilo-
grams of fish per unit effort) reflect an increase 
in the total fishing efforts throughout those 
same years (Figure II). In other words, while 
fish production has decreased by around 
28.7% over the past 8 years, the hours recorded 
at sea have in fact increased. Abundance 
indicators, a mechanism used by administra-
tive agencies to understand the biomass condi-
tion at a given moment in time, find that fish 
stocks in Bahrain are at a declining stage and 
outside safe biological limits (DOF, 2013).  
The decrease in fish landings is even more 
staggering when evaluated by trap method. 
Professional fishermen, depending on their 
training, income, and community, rely on 
different methods of capturing fish. On the one 
hand, some few with economic means are able 
to purchase large boats and are given the title 
of bahara. On the other hand, the large majori-
ty of Bahraini fishermen rely on more tradi-
tional traps and peasant boats (also known as 
speed boats). The latter type use three main 
categories of fish traps: garageer (large wire 
traps), huthoor (small wire traps), and hook and 
line (line fishing). Total catch from traditional 
means have significantly been reduced and 
have not recorded an increase in production 
since over a decade ago (DOF, 2013). Experts 
predict that, within the next several decades, 
traditional fishing in Bahrain will become 
extinct. 
“The mechanisms by which these traditional 
fishing tools are utilized are no longer 
relevant. The huthoor and garageer only 
operate in inter-tidal areas, the high tide 
drifts them into the fish traps and, when the 
tide goes down, fishermen can pick up their 
catch. With extensive land reclamation 
activities, we’re losing these vital inter-tidal 
lands” (I. Al-Madany, personal commu-
nication, December 19th, 2013).
Nonetheless, while expert commentary on the 
relationship between reclamation and the 
decreasing fish landings, official regulatory 
institutions have attributed these losses to 
overfishing practices, placing the blame on 
fishermen. While it is true that overfishing is 
currently taking place in the waters of Bahrain, 
it emerged as a consequence of the policies 
adopted by the national government following 
the negative effects of land reclamation opera-
tions. In the late 1980s, and a noted in 
Al-Madany’s Coastal Zone Management in 
Bahrain: an Analysis of Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts of Dredging and Reclama-
tion, fish imports were rising and the country 
was importing 24.6% of its fish stock 
(Al-Madany et al., 1991).  The net balance 
indicated an overall loss, with the gap further 
widening. In 1995, the government of Bahrain 
instituted a set of policies aimed at reforming 
the balance of payments and improving the 
fish production within the island (Figure III). 
One of those reforms was the removal of caps 
on fishing and boat licenses (I. Al-Madany, 
2013). 
Though the policy was legally revoked in 2002 
following large complaints by local fishermen 
and environmentalists, the figures reported by 
the Directorate of Fisheries see increases 
extending past that year. Since its implementa-
tion, fishing licenses increased from 291 licens-
es in 1996 to 1,206 licenses in 2012 - a near 314% 
jump (Figure IV). On average, license distribu-
tion grew by an alarming 182%. Similarly, boat 
license issuance display a similar trend, grow-
ing from 1,907 in 1997 to 2,428 in 2004 (Figure 
V). While recent figures for boat licenses are 
not yet published, the seven-year range reflects 
a 27% increase. Current figures show a signifi-
cant increase in the number of licenses issued 
between 1996 and 2012. The total number of 
fishermen in the waters by 2004 had increased 
by 100%, stabilizing at around 9,165 fishermen 
from an average of 4,555 in 1983 (DOF, 2013). 
This increase of fishermen in a confined area is 
quite problematic, given that the regional 
waters assigned to Bahrain following the GCC 
of the 1980s had considerably shrunk after the 
redistribution of ocean territories between 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Qatar (Held & Ulrichsen, 2012).
While an increase in fishing and boat licenses is 
a disconcerting reality of overfishing caused by 
dredging-related policies, local fishermen are 
more perturbed by the growth in foreign 
fishermen receiving said licenses. While docu-
mentation of foreign to Bahraini fishermen is 
only available for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 
2004, the figures are quite distressing (Table 
III). Between 1983 and 2004, the number of 
full-time Bahraini fishermen stayed relatively 
the same, dropping by an insignificant 
percentage from 1,822 in 1983 to 1,714 in 2004. 
In contrast, the number of foreign full-time 
fishermen was on a steady increase, rising 
from a mere 304 fishermen in 1983 to approxi-
mately 3,000 in 2004 - a change amounting to 
an 885% increase in just over a decade. By 2004, 
the majority of Bahraini fishermen, just around 
2,145 individuals, were practicing the trade 
part-time while no foreign fishermen worked 
part-time (DOF, 2013). 
The fear of an increasing population of foreign 
fishermen is not one of prejudice but one of 
environmental rationale.  According to fisher-
men, foreigners are invited to Bahrain in an 
effort to alter the political balance of the nation 
though the lack of regulatory enforcements. 
Employers are thus able to hire workers under 
the promise of a “free visa”. The “free-visa” 
phenomenon refers to the illegal payment of a 
sum of money to a worker’s sponsor (also 
known as a kafeel) in exchange for taking up 
jobs without a work permit or contract. The 
phenomenon has been highly criticized in the 
Bahraini media for quite some time now 
because it leads to the hiring of under-qualified 
laborers and the overflow of the market 
(AlHasan, 2012). It doesn’t matter who the 
individual is or what knowledge they have in 
regards to the preservation and cultivation of 
the trade, an exchange is made in quid pro quo 
fashion: foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
India, and other countries of the South East - 
usually tailors, drivers, and anything but 
professional fishermen - are brought into the 
country and are assigned to boats of royal 
nokhitha [captains]. No skills assessment goes 
into the process of selecting these individuals. 
They get a paying job, and the nokitha has 
laborers doing the job for him now. 
“These workers come to Bahrain on a tempo-
rary basis, they are not invested in learning 
the trade in a sustainable way in order to 
protect it from damage. Then again, who 
can blame them? They are not the ones 
setting the policies” (Fisherman III, 
personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). 
Reductions in total fish landings and the 
increase in total fishermen at sea translate into 
net reductions in annual incomes for profes-
sional in the trade. According to Fisherman X, 
“incomes have decreased significantly after 
[these massive] reclamation projects such as 
Diyar al Muharraq and Al-Madina 
Al-Shamaliya, I’d say around 70 to 80 
percent. You have to understand that we 
don’t have the means or the finances to meet 
the changing regional patterns created by 
reclamation. I personally receive BD 90 
(approximately US $239) a month for my 
landings - most fishermen in the Northern 
villages receive around the same. Some do 
still make a large amount, between BD 400 
and BD 600 (approximately US $1,060 and 
US $1,590 respectively), but that’s only for 
those who have governmental connections. 
The market structure, it’s not supporting 
any of us” (Fisherman X, personal 
communication, January 14th, 2014).
It should be noted that the large majority of the 
country’s catch is produced by the thousands 
of small inshore peasant boats [dhows] operat-
ing over the shallow reefs and sea-grass beds 
that surround the islands of Bahrain (Al-Mada-
ny, 1991). While unemployment rates are 
currently unavailable for this sector of industry 
due to ambiguities in full-time, part-time, occa-
sional, and recreational employment, inter-
views with professionals and fishermen 
indicate that it is relatively low simply due to 
the act of generational succession in the trade. 
The resulting lost income is compounded 
when taking into consideration the rise in the 
price of living and complementary goods in 
combination with the structure of the market. 
The price of gas (diesel) is of a particular 
importance to fishermen, especially since the 
large majority of them own some version of 
gas-run boats (specifically peasant speedboats 
or banoosh). The structure of market and 
governmental loans are also important points 
of analysis here. The Bahraini fish market is not 
subjected to free trade, and fishermen are not 
permitted to sell their fish stock abroad for 
better prices. A common theme of frustration 
begins to emerge in interviews when fisher-
men begin comparing the market economy in 
Bahrain to that in place elsewhere in the Gulf 
(Table IV). In Bahrain, fishermen are given two 
loans of BD 5,000 (US $13,262) with low inter-
est and fees to be paid off in seven years. The 
loan is supplied so that fishermen may 
upgrade their fishing equipment (Fisherman I 
& II, personal communication, January 12th, 
2014). Diesel, the most expensive complemen-
tary good in the industry, has risen 30 fils per 
liter (US $0.08 per liter) over the past ten years. 
Today, fishermen pay 100 fils per liter for gas. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the price of diesel is set 
to increase to 180 fils per liter (US $0.48 per 
liter) and, under Bahrain’s fishing subsidies, 
fishermen will be able to purchase diesel for 30 
fils less than the market price (TradeArabia, 
2013; Fisherman I, 2014). That is still a 50% 
increase in the span of three years, and, though 
fishermen have objected to this hike and have 
consistently reached out to government 
officials with invitations to general meetings 
(wherein they can discuss their grievances), the 
government has yet to accept these invitations 
(Fisherman VI, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014). When compared to the prices 
of diesel and general subsidies in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, fisher-
men in Bahrain find the local market to be the 
least supported in all situations.
With reductions in income and ever increasing 
costs, fishermen should have received just 
compensation for their losses. However, the 
system of compensations is quite elusive in 
Bahrain and complicates the impacts of plan-
ning further. One particular example, Al-Ma-
dina Al-Shamaliya (Image I), exemplifies the 
haziness of compensation policies. The project 
involved mass reclamation of 10 separate 
islands, nearly 7.40 square kilometers, on the 
Northern coast of Bahrain. Developed as the 
site of a large-scale public housing project by 
the Ministry of Housing, the development 
neighbored four major fishing villages: 
Al-Diraz, Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya. 
The location was selected following multiple 
site studies. While it was the most economical-
ly sound area for reclamation, traditional 
fishing traps in the area - called huthoor in the 
local language - were severely damaged by the 
first phase of dredging (Ali Salman, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2013). Fisher-
men in neighboring villages relied on the use 
of huthoor for profit, given that the majority 
having received no practical training in the 
trade by any other means.
According to the Ministry of Housing, the 
Directorate of Fisheries was contacted about 
the system of compensations whereby fisher-
men who lost their huthoor were compensat-
ed. The Directorate of Fisheries had no such 
mechanism. The Bahrain Center for Data and 
Research (BCDR), a research institute no 
longer in operation, was then hired to study 
the impacts of reclamation on the fishermen at 
the site. Fishermen were a representative of 
huthoor owners, professional bahara, and recre-
ational bahara, but only those with official 
licenses from the government were included in 
the compensation budget. All licenses, titles, 
and names were gathered through the Direc-
torate of Fisheries and, following negotiations 
between BCDR and local fishermen, the Com-
pensation Committee determined the appro-
priate amount for reimbursements. Neither the 
Ministry of Housing nor the Directorate of 
Fisheries directly communicated with the 
fishermen about their losses. Huthoor owners 
were given a large amount for their losses, 
between BD 600 and BD 8,000 (US $1,590 and 
US $21,220 respectively). Bahara who owned 
boats but could no longer fish in the area 
following the completion of reclamation were 
awarded somewhere between BD 28,000 and 
BD 60,000 (US $74,270 and US $159,150 respec-
tively. This scale of compensations has yet to 
be seen in Bahrain. In fact, compensations are 
not legal requirements for development - they 
are not within the legislative bodies (A. 
Salman, 2013).  
The story told by the fishermen from Al-Diraz, 
Janusan, Barbar, and Al-Budaiya is quite 
different. Three professional fishermen were 
interviewed from these areas and none have 
seen any compensation for their losses. The 
fisherman from Al-Diraz establishes that there 
is no truth to these claims of compensation; it is 
all done for Public Relations purposes. 
“I own several huthoor in that seabed and 
nearly all of my fish traps were destroyed, 
but I was not given any compensation for 
these economic losses. Al-Diraz was the area 
most affected by these activities, being 
closest to the shoreline and all, but no one I 
know from my area received financial 
reimbursements,” he affirms (Fisherman 
VI, personal communication, January 
14th, 2014). 
Similar stories are concurred by other fisher-
men in Al-Budaiya. 
“In my community, only around twenty 
percent of fishermen were compensated for 
their losses. Most owned huthoor, none to 
my knowledge were bahara. However, they 
made no distinction between those who 
practice the trade full-time (professional) 
and those who are here part-time or on a 
recreational basis. That should have made a 
difference. Without a system for compensa-
tions however, we had no legitimate basis to 
bring our claims to the surface” (Fisher-
man VII, personal communication, 
January 14th, 2014). 
A government official who asked to remain 
anonymous supported these claims, giving the 
following statement: 
“The government has learned to lie. They 
say they’ve done the research but that is 
never true. They’ve created a rift in society, 
an us versus them dichotomy. Particularly 
following the uprising in 2011, they’ve 
made it a point to create a fallacious unity 
between governmental departments. 
Government can’t regulate government, 
even when the two are obviously at opposite 
ends. If reclamation is authorized by the 
Ministry of Public Works, neither the 
Directorate of Fisheries or the Supreme 
Council for the Environment can release 
documents with arguments against said 
authorization” (personal communica-
tion,  2013).
Another fisherman from the Al-Budaiya 
fishing community adds a point worthy of 
mentioning. 
“We’re talking about fishermen who own 
huthoor, meaning that they rely on these 
fish traps for their living - that’s the only 
way they know how to fish. Even if we 
received the compensations, do you think 
BD 600 or even BD 8,000 will provide us 
with enough lifetime revenue? For both our 
families and us? How many meals will that 
buy? The huthoor are a specific way of 
practicing the trade, it’s the only way we 
know how to fish. Take away our shallow 
waters [the only areas where huthoor can be 
used] and we have no future, no career” 
(Fisherman VIII, January 14th, 2014).  
The contradictions between government agen-
cies and fishermen statements expose the deep 
complications attached to financial compensa-
tions and market failures in the fishing econo-
my of Bahrain.
Social Impacts
An old Bahraini proverb goes: should a fisher-
man’s son approach his father with the inten-
tion of marriage, the father would reply: ‘hold 
off until the arbia’aniya [optimal monthly 
low-tide collection times]’; it was at that time 
that the huthoor would be completely filled and 
there would be abundant wealth to spend on 
the ceremony, a house for the young couple, 
and necessary finances (Fisherman I, 2014). 
The toll of reclamation activities on the fishing 
industry and, thus, on fishermen, has made the 
proverb a fading memory amongst these 
communities. 
The diminishing fish production in the region 
resulted in the extension of fishing day-trips. 
“We used to spend a day or two at sea and 
return with enough fish produce to keep us 
at home for the remainder of the week; now 
we are spending five to six days in the ocean, 
and we return with barely enough to 
support our families” (Fisherman V, 
2014). 
On average, 15.2% of the fishermen surveyed  
indicated that since the beginning of mass 
reclamation activities, their fishing trips had to 
move to deeper waters. With a limited skill set 
and education, the choice of leaving the indus-
try is not a viable option. Fishermen, 
comprised uniquely by fathers and sons, must 
spend more time away from their families in 
order to provide for their basic needs. Howev-
er, even with lengthier fishing trips, family 
provisions are still a major source of concern. 
Of the ninety-two fishermen surveyed, 88% 
pointed to an inability to provide for their 
families as a direct result of reclamation 
projects.  However, of all fishermen surveyed, 
only 10.9% indicated a fear of job insecurity 
while 83.7% said they have not considered 
changing their profession to one in a more 
stable industry. When asked to comment, the 
unanimous voice pointed to a lack of skills and 
training. An overwhelming majority of the 
men interviewed - representative of the fishing 
community in Bahrain - did not receive a 
complete high school education and thus had 
no alternative skills to fall back on. Fishing was 
all they knew how to do, and the option of 
relearning was either too expensive or too 
unstable for them to consider. 
State agreements made by countries within the 
GCC have compounded the social effects expe-
rienced by fishing communities in Bahrain. 
Over the course of thirty years, Bahrain’s 
regional waters shrunk to around one-third its 
size (Image II) following the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dundua, 2007). Within that time, reclamation 
activities drove fishermen into areas further 
away from the mainland. Survey data showed 
that 67.4% of respondents had to change their 
usual fishing areas as a result of losses attribut-
ed to development activities, while 35.9% 
admitted to fishing outside of the legal region-
al boundaries. 
Land reclamation has placed considerable 
pressure on fishermen to territorially expand 
their routes into foreign waters, including 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but particularly into the 
nearby areas of Qatar. Several news agencies 
emerged over the past decade with reports on 
the shooting and arrest of Bahraini fishermen 
by Coast and Borders Security forces after 
being caught fishing in foreign waters (Mahdi, 
2010). According to the Bahrain Human Rights 
Watch Society, Qatar has intensified its arrest 
records since 2010, with apprehensions being 
made every two days. That year alone, 106 
Bahraini fishermen were arrested by Qatari 
Coast Guards and were held for mass trial. 
Tens of fishermen were shot and wounded in 
similar contretemps (Richter, 2010). While the 
illegality of fishing in foreign waters is undis-
puted, some fishermen claim they were not  
notified when boundaries have shifted and 
could not tell where the legal boundaries 
began and ended. As a local fisherman 
explains: 
“I used to fish in the same place every week 
for 20 years. One day, I find my dhow 
surrounded by Qatari coastal guards as I’m 
being towed to the Qatari mainland. Instead 
of being arrested, I was fined nearly BD 
7,000 (approximately US $18,570) for 
crossing into foreign boundaries” (Fisher-
man IX, personal communication, Janu-
ary 14th, 2014).
To apprehend the intangible outcomes associ-
ated with land reclamation activities, one must 
simply look at the transformed relationship 
between fishing communities and the ocean. 
As expressed by the majority of fishermen 
interviewed, the cultural perception and 
attachment to the ocean has practically disap-
peared from these communities. 
Historically, fishing communities were found 
exclusively on coastal villages. Fishermen took 
comfort in docking their boats alongside the 
village’s shorelines because the boats would 
remain in eyesight at all times; they held one 
another accountable for the protection of each 
others‘ equipment. A sense of security came 
out of maintaining a visual connection with the 
ocean, even when the shorelines were made 
available for public use. Furthermore, the 
coastline became a central realm for social 
interaction in these communities. Fishermen 
spent the majority of their time along the shore: 
older men conversed for hours on their docks, 
keeping an eye on the children as they played 
and consumed themselves with leisure such as 
recreational fishing, jogging, and swimming 
(Al-Ansari, 2009). There was a sensory element 
to the communities’ interaction with the water; 
it was not simply visual. 
Land reclamation altered this relationship in 
several ways. As more shoreline was 
reclaimed, the villages grew further detached 
from the ocean. The visual connection with the 
docks that provided the community with secu-
rity could no longer be established. The shore-
lines became universal, no longer the responsi-
bility of any particular village. The most trans-
formative effect, however, came with the 
restructuring of social circles. Retired fisher-
men and children in particular had a very 
uneasy transition. These age groups consist of 
individuals with no vehicle access and who 
could not afford to walk the long distances 
required of them to get to the shoreline. This 
transformed the public spheres through which 
communities interacted. Today, you find the 
majority of community members scattered 
around various religious institutions and cafes, 
no longer connected to the ocean (F. Al-Ansari, 
personal communication, December 31st, 
2013). 
The snowball effect of reclamation compound-
ed the social impacts observed by these 
communities. As private residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development emerged on 
these newly constructed areas, land value in 
nearby neighborhoods also began to rise. Soon, 
families within villages resorted to building 
vertically for future generations because they 
could no longer afford purchasing new plots of 
land for their offspring. Congestion and over-
crowding became characteristics of what used 
to be the coastal villages of Bahrain (Map III).
X // PERCEPTIONS OF LEGALITY 
While the act of land reclamation is legal 
within the country’s judicial framework, the 
practice is far from such. There is nothing 
flawed about the legal planning process in 
Bahrain, but it is in the implementation and 
interpretation of the law that our system 
begins to fail (F. Al-Ansari, 2013). The collapse 
is two fold: A) in a broad definition through 
which developers can claim a necessity for 
reclamation and B) in a vague policy language 
for implementation. 
A) Currently, the procedure for obtaining a 
license to reclaim land is derived from three 
main categories: 
1. Water-dependent uses: uses for which 
oceanside locations are indispensable;
2. Water-related uses: uses that maximize 
the advantages of oceanside locations yet 
could still function efficiently away from 
the oceanline; and
3. Water-independent uses: uses which are 
neither dependent nor directly related to 
oceanside locations. 
The water-related uses form the most 
elusive category in the current context. 
Using this definition, private developers 
were allowed to reclaim shoreline and 
develop luxury residences and resorts 
(Image II) - essentially gated and elitist 
communities - such as Amwaj, Durrat 
Al-Bahrain, Diyar Al-Muharraq, and 
Al-Reef (F. Al-Ansari, 2013).
The majority of reclaimed land has been 
used by private developers to build unaf-
fordable homes and apartments. These new 
developments are usually purchased by 
foreign investors and workers or by wealth-
ier Bahraini families to be used as a second 
home. Diyar Al-Muharraq, a project span-
ning 12 square kilometers (approximately 
7.5 square miles) in Northern Bahrain, is 
built to accommodate 100,000 residents. 
Similarly, Durrat Al Bahrain opened to the 
public with a physical capacity of 60,000 
residents in an area spanning 21 square 
kilometers (approximately 13 square 
miles). Average home prices in these 
islands range from over BD 100,000 (US 
$265,238) to BD 700,000 (US $1,856,666), 
three times the median household income 
for a Bahraini resident. Meanwhile, public 
housing requests are increasing by 5% a 
year, averaging over 50,000 requests by the 
end of 2007 and increasing by a projected 
6,500 requests a year (Al-Sayed, 2007). The 
imbalance in supply and demand of hous-
ing further strained the tensions between 
state and society. 
B) As mentioned earlier, the provision of a 
legal framework in Bahrain does not trans-
late into its implementation. Vague legal 
language has been misused to reinterpret 
the law, such as in the provision of public 
spaces on newly reclaimed land. Reclama-
tion laws require 50% of new island exten-
sions be made public so as to ensure the 
maintenance of beach landscapes as open 
to all. However, the law clause uses the 
word ‘waterline’, not ‘shoreline’.  “Develop-
ers can thusdesign a 20 kilometer waterline 
with a shoreline of 2 kilometers, leaving only 1 
kilometer for public use. Diyar Al-Muharraq is 
a prime example of such a development, where 
the law was reinterpreted to allow only 300 
meters squared of shoreline to the public” (F. 
Al-Ansari, 2013). 
With such a lack of implementation, it is 
unsurprising that 94.6% of all survey 
respondents saw reclamation activities as 
illegal. That view is not only common 
amongst the fishermen communities but 
has become a concern for Bahraini politi-
cians as well. In 2010, a report published by 
the parliamentary committee found 65 
square kilometers of public lands had been 
recently sold or rented to private investors 
at a loss of estimated 15 billion Dinars 
(approximately US $5.64 billion). The 
report also found major irregularities in the 
government’s management and leasing of 
state-owned properties, further taking 
away from the lower income classes 
(Chayes and Matar, 2013).
Reclamation, usually addressed as a global 
physical and environmental planning issue, 
has become a highly politicized effort and a 
mechanism for perpetuating social inequality 
to many communities in Bahrain. Reclamation 
efforts are seen as excessive to the many 
citizens who question the current land owner-
ship (Map IV). Concern over the illegal distri-
bution of land titles to members of the royal 
family have been raised by many, including 
fishermen who are forced to into denser condi-
tions while land sits unused by its owners 
(Al-Sayed, 2007; Lubin, 2011). 
XI // IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE 
ON TRUST
 
The perception of illegal acts has lasting impli-
cations on trust within society. This research 
uses data obtained through experimental 
games to measure trust through urban space in 
Bahrain. Measuring trust is problematic due to 
the various definitions of the term. Some schol-
ars believe that personal experiences and 
engagement with other institutions define 
one’s trust in individuals and groups while 
others argue that social trust is formed through 
individual values and morality (Carpenter, 
2006). Despite the conflicting definitions, social 
scientists have relied on household surveys 
and experimental games to measure the mani-
fested trust in society. The following research 
combines both qualitative and quantitative 
data to understand the trust (or mistrust) 
between fishermen, one faction of civil society, 
and government in Bahrain. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, due to the political situation of 
the country, experimental games were used in 
lieu of interviews to indirectly address the 
issue of trust.
Experimental Games 
The experimental games, conducted in January 
2014, were designed to model the behavior of 
fishermen and their willingness to cooperate 
with state entities. The success of the experi-
mental game depends on the premise that 
fishermen will always make the first move. 
Information as to how government behaves is 
undisclosed. Each participant is given the 
option to cooperate or not cooperate with 
government on a third-party program aimed at 
offsetting reclamation consequences on the 
fishing industry through subsidies and indus-
try support mechanisms. The program 
includes monthly financial rewards for both 
fishermen and government, dependent on the 
cooperation of both sides. The games are 
variants of the prisoner’s dilemma, originally 
framed by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood in 
mid-twentieth century and formalized by 
Albert Tucker that same year. In the version 
developed for this research, each participant 
(fisherman) plays one round of three scenarios 
(Appendix IV). A total of 26 players participat-
ed in the games, and participants were 
instructed to make individual choices based 
only on the information provided by the exper-
imenter. 
Prior to beginning the rounds, basic informa-
tion was collected about each player: age, 
schooling, and estimated monthly income. 
Literature on trust suggests using a coopera-
tion index to control for cooperative predispo-
sitions, so a series of six polar questions  mod-
eled after those used by Carpenter, Daniere 
and Takahashi were posed to participants 
(Carpenter, 2006). No identifiable data was 
collected to protect the anonymity of partici-
pants. Players were instructed not to attempt 
communicating with one another until the 
game has ended. It is critical to note that all 
scenarios are based on the historical progres-
sion of land reclamation in the country. How-
ever, starting salaries and details regarding the 
third-party programs were fabricated to 
provide participants with more information. It 
is implied that no participant will be punished 
or rewarded for the decision other than the 
monetary compensations they will be receiv-
ing through the third party program. Once the 
game ends, all players participated in a 
follow-up conversation to detail how they 
came about their decisions.
Round One // Before Land Reclamation 
The first round introduces the first five-year 
plan prior to land reclamation activities. Each 
fisherman’s starting salary is set at BD 300 per 
month. The potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
25 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 50 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 5 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, a 
second scenario was introduced and the 
second round is played. 
Round Two // 5 Years After Land Reclamation 
The second round introduces the second 
five-year plan once 50 square kilometers of 
land were reclaimed. Participants are notified 
that such reclamation is unavoidable due to 
national growth needs. Each fisherman’s start-
ing salary is set at BD 250 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
75 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 100 per month; 
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 10 per month.
Decisions are not announced to the group but 
are written down on a piece of paper with the 
participant’s background information. Once 
every participant submits their answers, the 
third scenario was introduced and the third 
round is played. 
Round Three // 10 Years After Land Reclamation
The third round introduces the third five-year 
plan once 100 square kilometers of land were 
reclaimed. Again, participants are notified that 
such reclamation is unavoidable due to nation-
al growth needs. Each fisherman’s starting 
salary is set at BD 200 per month, BD 50 less 
than the first round due to the effects of recla-
mation. To account for the decrease in monthly 
salary, compensation amounts increased. The 
potential outcomes are as follows: 
a. If fishermen and government choose to 
cooperate, each receives an additional BD 
125 per month;
b. If fishermen cooperate but government 
does not, fishermen will receive no addi-
tional compensation while government will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month; 
c. If government cooperates but fishermen 
do not, government will receive no addi-
tional compensation while fishermen will 
receive an additional BD 150 per month;
d. If fishermen and government choose not 
to cooperate, each only receives an addi-
tional BD 15 per month.
At the end of the third round, all results were 
tabulated and interested players were given 
the opportunity to follow-up through conver-
sation with the experimenter. 
Results 
To measure the dimensions of trust in the data, 
experimental behavior was regressed on 
demographic controls. The independent 
variable, cooperation, was categorized as a 
binary with (1) reflecting cooperation and (0) 
reflecting noncooperation. As denoted earlier, 
the demographic variables were drawn from 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004b) and 
included: level of schooling fisherman has 
completed (SCHOOLING), the age of the 
fisherman (AGE), and the estimated monthly 
income of the fisherman rounded to the near-
est BD 50 (INCOME). The cooperation index 
(CINDEX), mentioned above, was scaled from 
0 to 6 equivalent to participants’ coopera-
tive-responses. Finally, before running the 
analysis, the variable for schooling was re-cate-
gorized into a binary where (1) represents a 
post-high school education and (0) represents 
any education level below that. The new 
category was generated due to the low number 
of observations for each category (n<30). The 
limited number of observations has significant-
ly restricted the model and thus descriptive 
statistics will be discussed in tandem with the 
regression results.        
A logistic regression was used to evaluate the 
relationship between the willingness to coop-
erate and the demographic control variables 
(Table V). Following the first round, results 
showed that only 10 of the 26 participants 
(38.5%) chose to cooperate. The mean age of 
the ten cooperative players is 53.1 years while 
the mean age of the uncooperative participants 
was 41.8 years. The average income for those 
who chose to cooperate was BD 490, BD 65 
higher than the mean of the sample, while the 
average income of uncooperative players was 
approximately BD 385 or BD 35 lower than the 
sample mean. The regression analysis showed 
that, while the number of observations was 
low, the age and education variables (at the 
90% level) and income variable (at the 80% 
level) had statistically significant results. In the 
first scenario, an additional year in age 
accounted for a 71.7% increase in cooperation. 
While the education variable is statistically 
significant, the odds of cooperation do not 
increase significantly with a post-high school 
education level when all other variables are 
held constant. Similarly, the odds of coopera-
tion are only 1.8% greater as monthly income 
rises. 
The statistical significance of the model weak-
ens as the scenario moves to the second and 
third five-year plans. In the second round, only 
7 participants (26.9%) chose to cooperate, an 
11.6% decrease. The age factor is no longer a 
statistically significant variable, and income is 
now significant at the 90% level but neverthe-
less only accounting for an odds ratio 4.4% 
greater. By the third round, only five partici-
pants (19.2%) decided to cooperate. The aver-
age salary for uncooperative participants rose 
to BD 405 while the mean salary for the partici-
pants who chose to cooperate was a high BD 
510. Similarly to the previous round however, 
the odds of cooperation were a negligible 2.5% 
greater with an additional unit of income and 
0.7% greater with a post high-school educa-
tion. While the model is still statistically signif-
icant in both rounds, the data we gather about 
cooperation is not as informative. As the 
proposed monthly salary decreased, fishermen 
found it more difficult to cooperate with 
government because the stakes of non-cooper-
ation were too high - they determined they’d 
only take on the risk of less compensation with 
great certainty of government cooperation. We 
refer to post-game interviews to better under-
stand trust between state and this segment of 
civil society. 
To supplement the quantitative interpretation 
of the experiment, short interviews were 
conducted with players once the game ended. 
The information gathered from the interviews 
reflected quite a bit about the reasoning behind 
individuals’ decisions. Of the 26 game partici-
pants, 10 agreed to follow-up with a discussion 
about their choice to cooperate or not to coop-
erate. The general sentiment echoed a history 
of failure and broken promises by the state. 
“First, [the state] promised they’d provide 
us with a compensation bank to help subsi-
dize some of the rising costs of living. It’s 
been five years and we have yet to see a cent 
of it. They provide us with tranquilizer 
statements: a promise every few months to 
calm us down with no intention of ever 
keeping it. They’ve distributed licenses 
illegally to those in their favor, then they 
misdiagnose the problem as that of overfish-
ing. They said they established a Tamkeen  
fund for us but it barely compensated any of 
our expenses” (Fisherman B, personal 
communication, January 16th, 2014).
Frustration brews within the community 
because of what is interpreted as a refusal to 
cooperate by the state. All interviewed partici-
pants who chose not to cooperate throughout 
the game did so assuming that government 
would not follow through with the commit-
ments on their end; should they have cooperat-
ed, they would receive no additional compen-
sation from the third-party and, thus, by that 
reasoning, uncooperative behavior would at 
least provide some sort of monetary compen-
sation. The concerns expressed by interview-
ees reflect a deep-rooted trust problem. The 
sentiments expressed in follow-up interviews 
are best encapsulated in the following quote: 
“The government does what they think is in 
their best interest, not ours. Our own 
parliament, one that is usually split across 
bipartisan lines, concluded that the reclama-
tion activities were detrimental to our 
environment and our industry. They 
produced a list of recommendations for the 
government to enact as a way of responding 
to the deteriorating conditions of our ocean 
(Appendix V). We haven’t seen any sign of 
cooperation by them, so why would I cooper-
ate? How do you trust an entity that acts on 
its self-interest”? (Fisherman A, experi-
mental game, January 15th 2014). 
The recommendations the participants were 
referencing are a set of deliverables produced 
by the Parlimentary Inquiry Committee 
regarding reclamation encroachment on coast-
al areas and the necessary measures to remedy 
the problem. The recommendations were 
directed mainly towards government agencies 
and included clauses such as developing a 
comprehensive strategy to protect and culti-
vate marine resources while compensating 
fishermen fairly for damages endured during 
reclamation, tightening government oversight 
of reclamation and dredging activities while 
seeking the help of reliable consulting compa-
nies to monitor and ensure all procedures have 
been followed, and updating marine maps 
every five years to reflect effective changes on 
land mass and fishing areas. Thus far, 27 of the 
29 recommendations were not implemented,  
one recommendation was partially implement-
ed, and one recommendation did not have 
enough information to assess (Abdulla, 2013).
Only two interviewed participants chose to 
cooperate for the entire game. For those play-
ers, the initial willingness to cooperate spurred 
from a past positive experience with govern-
ment outside the industry. Both fishermen 
described a relative political association with 
government officials and, given the polariza-
tion of the Bahraini community following the 
2011 uprising, emphasized ‘good’ behavior by 
the government in other industries - not in the 
fishing industry - as a justification for coopera-
tion. When specifically asked about the fishing 
industry, they refused to be uncooperative but 
agreed with their fellow fishermen’s state-
ments regarding a history of bad planning by 
the state. 
XII // SUMMARY AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS
The research proves that there exists a failure 
in planning for reclamation projects in 
Bahrain. While the economic benefits of recla-
mation go uncontested, it is inevitably the 
ineffective planning policies produced by the 
state that compounded the socioeconomic 
costs experienced by fishing communities. The 
decision to reclaim land with poor or low envi-
ronmental assessments led to considerable 
marine life losses, resulting in the distribution 
of more fishing licenses to meet export 
demands.  Not only did that result in overfish-
ing and the creation of an unsustainable indus-
try, but it also led to a significant reduction in 
incomes and general livelihoods. Socially, the 
outcomes were much graver. The failure to 
plan for the industry led to growing percep-
tions of illegitimacy and illegality of state 
actions, resulting in the deterioration of institu-
tional trust. 
Given the centralization of state powers and 
the large scale development already planned 
for reclaimed land, reversing the detrimental 
impacts of reclamation policies is too large a 
feat to take on. For that reason, recommenda-
tions to follow concentrate on both bottom-up, 
microscale approaches to combat planning 
failure such as the creation of a consolidated 
knowledge base and emphasizing communi-
ty-based organizing, as well as macroscale 
state sponsored retraining initiatives and the 
active strengthening of civil society. It should 
also be noted that recommendations already 
proposed by the parliament were not reiterat-
ed or considered because they have been 
continuously overlooked by the state. The 
research thus does not address the pressing 
and complex issue of trust in the community 
but instead suggests alternative solutions to 
pressing issues of overfishing and fishermen 
livelihoods. 
Creation of an Industry Knowledge Base 
Sidestepping the structural failures in the 
process of land reclamation for a moment, we 
are faced with the daunting reality of how 
much the industry and its ecology has trans-
formed within the past several decades. With 
the perpetual physical transformations reshap-
ing the island annually, knowledge of marine 
life - once learned through the trade – must be 
reevaluated. Fish populations have been 
shown to move consistently due to reclamation 
and dredging activities, yet no record or 
system has been developed to assess these 
conversions in marine life. The research 
proposes an investment in the spatial consoli-
dation of local knowledge so as to provide all 
fishermen with better insight and management 
over their respective fishing locales. 
 
Spatial approaches have used Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to visually map the 
change in fishing areas over time. While 
predominantly countries in Europe, such as 
the United Kingdom, have used GIS, a model 
has been developed in Bahrain as well for 
research purposes. Professors at the University 
of Bahrain converted existing paper maps and 
GPS coordinates (with an accuracy of +/- 50 m) 
into GIS coverages and drew in the polygons 
using architectural software (Al-A’ali et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, the mapping system is 
very rudimentary and lacks both the technical 
and spatial precision in defining fishing areas. 
With better data collection mechanisms, there 
lies great potential in the use of spatial 
approaches for fisheries impact analysis. This 
could not only serve fishermen communities 
but also help monitor and evaluate the sustain-
ability of the industry long-term.  
Emphasis on Community-Based Organizing 
While the systematic impacts of reclamations 
are hard to counter, an opportunity exists to 
build community based organizations to oper-
ate with collective interests. The case for a 
bottom-up approach is based on self-managed 
fisheries systems such as Port Lincoln, a small 
remote fishing town in Southern Australia. In 
Port Lincoln, the fishermen themselves are 
quick to fight overfishing by acting in the 
collective interest, sometimes placing stricter 
limits on fishing than that decreed by the 
government. Instead, they operate through the 
use of property rights to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons, what Hardin describes as the 
destruction of a common resource available to 
all because of individual interests. Lobstermen 
at Port Lincoln each own a percentage of traps 
used and not an area of the ocean while 
sharing the maintenance costs and ocean 
knowledge (Tierney, 2000).  
The medallion system does, however, produce 
a political problem of divvying up the land-
ings: are quotas and licenses equally allocated 
between all fishermen? How are catch rates to 
be calculated? Should locals get priority? 
While these details are critical to the sustain-
ability of community-based organizing, they 
cannot be universally answered and thus must 
be established by the local fishing population 
of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the Port Lincoln 
example serves as a successful case study of 
community-based organizing in an effort to 
protect a shared natural resource. Moving 
from the individual to the collective allows for 
three unique opportunities: sustaining fish 
resources and the prevention of overfishing, 
knowledge consolidation about fishing 
grounds, and political organizing. 
Previous plans were proposed by fishermen 
but relied on institutionalizing by the state. Of 
such plans was the introduction of a 
whole-market approach whereby fishermen 
licenses can be bought out and instead be 
reintegrated into other areas of the market 
such as in the sale of produce at community 
fish markets. The sale and operation of 
produce markets is currently operated by the 
state, and fishermen that proposed this plan to 
officials have yet to hear back. Such proposals 
can still be supported through private funding. 
State Sponsored Retraining Initiatives 
Given the current situation of fisheries in 
Bahrain, a state sponsored intervention is 
encouraged to better address the tensions in 
the industry. As the findings showed, many 
fishermen cannot consider the option of 
leaving the trade because of the costs associat-
ed with changing professions and their limited 
skillsets. There exists a pragmatic opportunity 
here for the establishment of public retraining 
centers for those interested in transitioning 
into a different industry. This can be beneficial 
in multiple ways. First, it will actively limit 
excessive fishing activities by reducing the 
number of fishermen in Bahraini waters. 
Second, fishermen who are removed from the 
water can be reskilled in industries that the 
country depends on for GDP growth – such as 
aluminum manufacturing – and will thus 
strengthen the economy. Bahrain has become a 
service and manufacturing economy, signifi-
cantly reinvesting funds into the aforemen-
tioned industries. Younger generations of 
fishermen need to be given the opportunity to
be a part of the new economy. Finally, the 
potential gross income of both fishermen and 
ex-fishermen being retrained in service and 
manufacturing will reach an equilibrium given
that the former will profit off of higher person-
al catch rates while the latter is employed in 
industries that currently have a supply-short-
age and which provide a more stable income.-
Finally, the potential gross income of both 
fishermen and ex-fishermen being retrained 
will stabilize as the former will reap more 
profit off of their catch rates while the latter is 
given the opportunity to seek urban employ-
ment in industries that currently have a 
supply-shortage. 
Active Strengthening of Civil Society
Ensuring more effective national plans with an 
uncooperative government, as the analysis 
shows, is a difficult feat. However, a strength-
ened civil society can develop the power to 
alter state behavior. A living and watchful 
society must play a role in supporting honest 
behavior and in banishing economic crime, 
and that can be accomplished with a sufficient 
number of citizens who feel empowered 
enough to work towards exposing publicly 
illegal acts or malpractices of both private and 
state agents (Platteau, 1994). A strong civil 
society, comprised of autonomous organiza-
tions and institutions, can engage in popular 
protest movements (Sorensen, 2005), and artic-
ulate demands for the public interest should 
they be no longer met by the nation-state. 
Global studies have proven the effectiveness of 
societal action in an effort to combat bad plan-
ning. A case study on Bangladesh suggests that 
participation at the local level can produce a 
multiplicity of local developments determined 
by the people themselves – a space of freedom 
from the state (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Strengthening the ties of civil society supplies 
the collective movement with the power of 
pressuring the state to act in an altruistic 
fashion.
XIII // SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
The conclusions of the analysis are not meant 
to establish the causality of the 2011 uprisings 
in Bahrain. They are, however, used to serve as 
one explanation for the growing tensions 
between state and civil society. Though the 
specific results of the case study only express 
the viewpoints of fishermen, the concluding 
remarks reflect a collective disgruntlement and 
unwillingness to cooperate with what is 
perceived to be an untrustworthy government 
institution. 
While the aforementioned recommendations 
address the impact on fishermen, multiple 
groups throughout the country echo the gener-
al sentiments regarding the state’s failure to 
plan for its people; there exist deep structural 
and systematic problems in the governing 
decisions of the state. Planning failure is docu-
mented in the inability to produce sufficient 
public housing, the low quality education, and 
the deficient supply of other public goods, 
leaving the underlying tension between state 
and civil society unaddressed.   Eventually, 
state led interventions need to be made in 
order to address the instability currently 
spread throughout the country. The polity of 
Bahrain is not a sustainable one, representing a 
strong autocratic regime and a corrupt state 
authority that is weakening the state. Howev-
er, literature has consistently identified a 
correlation between the strength of a state-civil 
society relationship and the strength of a 
nation (Sorensen, 2005; Howard, 2008; 
Rotberg, 2004). Therefore, immediate steps – 
be it in a compromise in the political realm or a 
development strategy focused on the discon-
tent masses – must be taken to mend the 
current interaction. Reconstructing social 
capital and the effecting trust in the aftermath 
of tension is difficult but not impossible. Levels 
of “interpersonal trust, public spirit, communi-
ty participation, sense of wellbeing, and 
optimism” are target areas for a state to 
address failure and to reconcile civil discontent 
(Rotberg, 2004).  
XIV // CONCLUSIONS
This research sought to explain the socioeco-
nomic impacts of land reclamation policies on 
fishermen communities in Bahrain as a means 
of understanding the current fragile state-soci-
ety dynamics. The results exposed the state’s 
failures in incorporating the populations most 
adversely affected by the plans into the plan-
ning process and broken promises to its 
citizens, creating a mistrusting attitude within 
fishermen communities. While the case study 
represents only one faction of civil society, it 
provides insight into the wider relationship 
between the state and its citizenry. Further-
more, it identifies an explanation of the deteri-
orating political atmosphere in Bahrain since it 
became a constitutional monarchy. The 
nation-state is heading down a path of failure, 
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particularly if civil discontent is not addressed 
through better planning policies. It is therefore 
important for the state to take immediate 
conciliatory steps to remedy its relationship 
with citizens to avoid a total system collapse. 
Only then will conditions to strengthen the 
nation be established.  
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Notes
1. The statements posed to participants were: 
“Cooperation is better than competition (+)”; 
“People should listen to their conscience when 
making decisions (+)”; “People should forgive 
others easily (+)”; “Given a choice, I will act in what 
benefits me the most (-)”; “Confrontations should 
be avoided (+)”; “I find value in helping others (+)”; 
positive and negative signs, as designed by 
Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi, indicate 
whether a player’s score increases or decreases by a 
point. The index ranges from 0 to 6.
2. Tamkeen is an organization established by the 
state in 2006 tasked with supporting Bahrain’s 
private sector by fostering the creation of enterpris-
es. 
